Abrégé

A method of operating a computing apparatus, which includes receiving a signed message including a digital asset xo and a signature {F, H}. A public key associated with a private key that is unknown to the computing apparatus is received, the public key including sp, sq, pij′, qij′, μij and viji=0 to n+λ, j=1 to m, with λ, n and m being predetermined integers. Based on the signature, the public key and the digital asset, it is verified whether the following validation equation holds true: A method of operating a computing apparatus, which includes receiving a signed message including a digital asset xo and a signature {F, H}. A public key associated with a private key that is unknown to the computing apparatus is received, the public key including sp, sq, pij′, qij′, μij and viji=0 to n+λ, j=1 to m, with λ, n and m being predetermined integers. Based on the signature, the public key and the digital asset, it is verified whether the following validation equation holds true: ∑ i = 0 n + λ U i ⁢ j ( H ) ⁢ x 0 i = ∑ i = 0 n + λ V i ⁢ j ( F ) ⁢ x 0 i , j = 1 ⁢ to ⁢ m , where U i ⁢ j ( H ) = Hp ′ i ⁢ j - s p ⁢ ⌊ H ⁢ μ i ⁢ j / R ⌋ ⁢ mod ⁢ p V i ⁢ j ( F ) = Fq ′ i ⁢ j - s q ⁢ ⌊ F ⁢ v i ⁢ j / R ⌋ ⁢ mod ⁢ p A method of operating a computing apparatus, which includes receiving a signed message including a digital asset xo and a signature {F, H}. A public key associated with a private key that is unknown to the computing apparatus is received, the public key including sp, sq, pij′, qij′, μij and viji=0 to n+λ, j=1 to m, with λ, n and m being predetermined integers. Based on the signature, the public key and the digital asset, it is verified whether the following validation equation holds true: ∑ i = 0 n + λ U i ⁢ j ( H ) ⁢ x 0 i = ∑ i = 0 n + λ V i ⁢ j ( F ) ⁢ x 0 i , j = 1 ⁢ to ⁢ m , where U i ⁢ j ( H ) = Hp ′ i ⁢ j - s p ⁢ ⌊ H ⁢ μ i ⁢ j / R ⌋ ⁢ mod ⁢ p V i ⁢ j ( F ) = Fq ′ i ⁢ j - s q ⁢ ⌊ F ⁢ v i ⁢ j / R ⌋ ⁢ mod ⁢ p In case the validation equation holds true for all j=1 to m, it is concluded that the signature was derived from the digital asset and the private key, and the signature is considered authentic.

Classes IPC  ?

• H04L 9/32 - Dispositions pour les communications secrètes ou protégéesProtocoles réseaux de sécurité comprenant des moyens pour vérifier l'identité ou l'autorisation d'un utilisateur du système
• H04L 9/08 - Répartition de clés

Abrégé

0n01λ01λλ that are also data elements of the private key. The value of x is assigned to the digital asset, which is then stored in non-transitory memory or packaged in a message sent over the data network.

Classes IPC  ?

• H04L 9/30 - Clé publique, c.-à-d. l'algorithme de chiffrement étant impossible à inverser par ordinateur et les clés de chiffrement des utilisateurs n'exigeant pas le secret

Abrégé

Cryptographic methods and systems for key exchange, digital signature and zero-knowledge proof. In the digital signature scenario, there is provided a method of signing a digital document, comprising: obtaining a private cryptographic key associated with the signer; obtaining a digital asset from the digital document; selecting a base data element; computing a plurality of signature data elements from (i) the digital asset, (ii) the base data element and (iii) the private cryptographic key; and transmitting the digital document and the plurality of signature data elements to a recipient over a data network. Provenance of the digital document is confirmable by the recipient carrying out a predefined computation involving the digital document, the signature data elements, a plurality of noise variables and a public cryptographic key corresponding to the private cryptographic key associated with the signer. In the zero-knowledge proof scenario, the digital asset plays the role of a challenge data element.

Classes IPC  ?

• H04L 9/40 - Protocoles réseaux de sécurité
• H04L 9/32 - Dispositions pour les communications secrètes ou protégéesProtocoles réseaux de sécurité comprenant des moyens pour vérifier l'identité ou l'autorisation d'un utilisateur du système
• H04L 9/06 - Dispositions pour les communications secrètes ou protégéesProtocoles réseaux de sécurité l'appareil de chiffrement utilisant des registres à décalage ou des mémoires pour le codage par blocs, p. ex. système DES
• H04L 9/30 - Clé publique, c.-à-d. l'algorithme de chiffrement étant impossible à inverser par ordinateur et les clés de chiffrement des utilisateurs n'exigeant pas le secret
• H04L 9/08 - Répartition de clés

Abrégé

λ that are also data elements of the private key. The value of x is assigned to the digital asset, which is then stored in non-transitory memory or packaged in a message sent over the data network.

Classes IPC  ?

• H04L 9/00 - Dispositions pour les communications secrètes ou protégéesProtocoles réseaux de sécurité
• H04L 9/06 - Dispositions pour les communications secrètes ou protégéesProtocoles réseaux de sécurité l'appareil de chiffrement utilisant des registres à décalage ou des mémoires pour le codage par blocs, p. ex. système DES
• H04L 9/08 - Répartition de clés
• H04L 9/30 - Clé publique, c.-à-d. l'algorithme de chiffrement étant impossible à inverser par ordinateur et les clés de chiffrement des utilisateurs n'exigeant pas le secret

Abrégé

Cryptographic methods and systems for key exchange, digital signature and zero-knowledge proof. In the digital signature scenario, there is provided a method of signing a digital document, comprising: obtaining a private cryptographic key associated with the signer; obtaining a digital asset from the digital document; selecting a base data element; computing a plurality of signature data elements from (i) the digital asset, (ii) the base data element and (iii) the private cryptographic key; and transmitting the digital document and the plurality of signature data elements to a recipient over a data network. Provenance of the digital document is confirmable by the recipient carrying out a predefined computation involving the digital document, the signature data elements, a plurality of noise variables and a public cryptographic key corresponding to the private cryptographic key associated with the signer. In the zero-knowledge proof scenario, the digital asset plays the role of a challenge data element.

Classes IPC  ?

• H04L 9/40 - Protocoles réseaux de sécurité
• H04L 9/08 - Répartition de clés
• H04L 9/06 - Dispositions pour les communications secrètes ou protégéesProtocoles réseaux de sécurité l'appareil de chiffrement utilisant des registres à décalage ou des mémoires pour le codage par blocs, p. ex. système DES
• H04L 9/32 - Dispositions pour les communications secrètes ou protégéesProtocoles réseaux de sécurité comprenant des moyens pour vérifier l'identité ou l'autorisation d'un utilisateur du système
• H04L 9/30 - Clé publique, c.-à-d. l'algorithme de chiffrement étant impossible à inverser par ordinateur et les clés de chiffrement des utilisateurs n'exigeant pas le secret

Abrégé

Cryptographic methods and systems for key exchange, digital signature and zero-knowledge proof. In the digital signature scenario, there is provided a method of signing a digital document, comprising: obtaining a private cryptographic key associated with the signer; obtaining a digital asset from the digital document; selecting a base data element; computing a plurality of signature data elements from (i) the digital asset, (ii) the base data element and (iii) the private cryptographic key; and transmitting the digital document and the plurality of signature data elements to a recipient over a data network. Provenance of the digital document is confirmable by the recipient carrying out a predefined computation involving the digital document, the signature data elements, a plurality of noise variables and a public cryptographic key corresponding to the private cryptographic key associated with the signer. In the zero-knowledge proof scenario, the digital asset plays the role of a challenge data element.

Classes IPC  ?

• H04L 9/32 - Dispositions pour les communications secrètes ou protégéesProtocoles réseaux de sécurité comprenant des moyens pour vérifier l'identité ou l'autorisation d'un utilisateur du système
• H04L 9/30 - Clé publique, c.-à-d. l'algorithme de chiffrement étant impossible à inverser par ordinateur et les clés de chiffrement des utilisateurs n'exigeant pas le secret

Abrégé

A digital processing method, which comprises obtaining a stream of N-bit input data words; obtaining a value k between 0 and M−1, inclusively, where M>1; processing each of the N-bit input data words at least based on the kth of M permutation elements to produce a corresponding N-bit output data word; and outputting a stream of N-bit output data words on a network or storing the stream of the N-bit output data words in a non-transitory storage medium.

Classes IPC  ?

• H04L 9/06 - Dispositions pour les communications secrètes ou protégéesProtocoles réseaux de sécurité l'appareil de chiffrement utilisant des registres à décalage ou des mémoires pour le codage par blocs, p. ex. système DES
• G06F 7/58 - Générateurs de nombres aléatoires ou pseudo-aléatoires
• H04L 9/08 - Répartition de clés

Produits et services

Downloadable/recorded computer hardware and software for information security namely, firewall, anti-virus protection, intrusion prevention, network vulnerability assessment, network traffic analysis and security management systems; Information security systems, namely computer hardware and recorded computer software that implement security controls protecting organizations, individuals and devices from security threats Computer hardware installation Computer software installation, integration and deployment services in the field of information security and cybersecurity; Consulting, research and development services in the field of Internet and information security; Computer services, namely, cloud hosting provider services for securing information in transit and on personal and institutional storage devices

Abrégé

A process for signing a digital message, comprising: (A) generating an intermediate variable from a plurality of inputs comprising at least: (i) a first public component associated with the sender; (ii) a private component associated with the sender; and (iii) the digital message; (B) generating a signature from a plurality of inputs comprising at least: (i) a second public component associated with the sender; and (ii) the intermediate variable; (C) creating an augmented message for transmission to a remote device, the augmented message including at least: (1) the digital message or an original message from which the digital message is derived; and (2) a fingerprint generated from a plurality of inputs comprising at least: (i) the first public component associated with the sender; (ii) the private component associated with the sender; and (iii) the digital message; and (3) the signature. The augmented message is transmitted or stored in memory.

Classes IPC  ?

• G06F 21/64 - Protection de l’intégrité des données, p. ex. par sommes de contrôle, certificats ou signatures
• G06F 21/62 - Protection de l’accès à des données via une plate-forme, p. ex. par clés ou règles de contrôle de l’accès
• H04L 9/06 - Dispositions pour les communications secrètes ou protégéesProtocoles réseaux de sécurité l'appareil de chiffrement utilisant des registres à décalage ou des mémoires pour le codage par blocs, p. ex. système DES
• H04L 9/30 - Clé publique, c.-à-d. l'algorithme de chiffrement étant impossible à inverser par ordinateur et les clés de chiffrement des utilisateurs n'exigeant pas le secret
• H04L 12/58 - Systèmes de commutation de messages

Abrégé

A method to securely transmit a secret from a sender to a recipient, comprising: (i) computing a first cipher from the secret, at least one noise data element and a first set of public data elements, wherein the first set of public data elements correspond to a first set of recipient-held data elements that are unknown to the sender; (ii) computing a second cipher from the secret, the at least one noise data element and a second set of public data elements, wherein the second set of public data elements correspond to a second set of recipient-held data elements that are unknown to the sender; and (iii) transmitting the first cipher and the second cipher to the recipient; wherein the secret is derivable by a predefined arithmetic computation involving the first cipher, the second cipher, the first set of recipient-held data elements and the second set of recipient-held data elements.

Classes IPC  ?

• H04L 9/14 - Dispositions pour les communications secrètes ou protégéesProtocoles réseaux de sécurité utilisant plusieurs clés ou algorithmes
• G06F 21/62 - Protection de l’accès à des données via une plate-forme, p. ex. par clés ou règles de contrôle de l’accès
• H04L 12/58 - Systèmes de commutation de messages
• H04L 9/30 - Clé publique, c.-à-d. l'algorithme de chiffrement étant impossible à inverser par ordinateur et les clés de chiffrement des utilisateurs n'exigeant pas le secret

Abrégé

A digital communication method over an optical channel. Bob modulates a coherent optical signal with a random envelope phase φr, known to him and not to Alice, and transmits the modulated coherent optical signal (envelope) over the optical channel to Alice. Alice further modulates the envelope with a key phase φk, based on a secret key and a selected modulation scheme, to create a cipher envelope, and sends the cipher envelope towards Bob along the optical channel. Bob then demodulates a received version of the cipher envelope by removing the random envelope phase φr (known to Bob) and then measures the phase of the resulting demodulated coherent optical signal with the coherent detector to extract, to within a certain margin of error, the key phase φk, from which Alice's secret key can be decoded. Bob then uses the secret key for encrypting messages sent to Alice over any digital network.

Classes IPC  ?

• H04B 10/556 - Modulation numérique, p. ex. modulation par déplacement de phase différentielle [DPSK] ou modulation par déplacement de fréquence [FSK]
• H04B 10/70 - Communications quantiques photoniques

Abrégé

A digital communication method over an optical channel. Bob modulates a coherent optical signal with a random envelope phase φr, known to him and not to Alice, and transmits the modulated coherent optical signal (envelope) over the optical channel to Alice. Alice further modulates the envelope with a key phase φk, based on a secret key and a selected modulation scheme, to create a cipher envelope, and sends the cipher envelope towards Bob along the optical channel. Bob then demodulates a received version of the cipher envelope by removing the random envelope phase φr (known to Bob) and then measures the phase of the resulting demodulated coherent optical signal with the coherent detector to extract, to within a certain margin of error, the key phase φk, from which Alice's secret key can be decoded. Bob then uses the secret key for encrypting messages sent to Alice over any digital network.

Classes IPC  ?

• H04L 9/06 - Dispositions pour les communications secrètes ou protégéesProtocoles réseaux de sécurité l'appareil de chiffrement utilisant des registres à décalage ou des mémoires pour le codage par blocs, p. ex. système DES
• H04L 29/06 - Commande de la communication; Traitement de la communication caractérisés par un protocole
• H04B 10/61 - Récepteurs cohérents
• H04B 10/556 - Modulation numérique, p. ex. modulation par déplacement de phase différentielle [DPSK] ou modulation par déplacement de fréquence [FSK]
• H04L 29/08 - Procédure de commande de la transmission, p.ex. procédure de commande du niveau de la liaison

Abrégé

A computer-implemented method, which comprises: receiving an input message comprising N-bit input segments, N being an integer greater than one; converting the N-bit input segments into corresponding N-bit output segments using a 2N-by-2N one-to-one mapping stored in a non-transitory storage medium; and generating an output message comprising the N-bit output segments. Also, a computer-implemented method for a recipient to validate a message received from a sender, the message including a first part and a second part. This method comprises receiving a token from a witnessing entity; obtaining a first data element by joint processing of the first part of the message and the token; obtaining a second data element by joint processing of the second part of the message using a key associated with the sender; and validating the message by comparing the first and second data elements.

Classes IPC  ?

• H04L 9/06 - Dispositions pour les communications secrètes ou protégéesProtocoles réseaux de sécurité l'appareil de chiffrement utilisant des registres à décalage ou des mémoires pour le codage par blocs, p. ex. système DES
• H04L 9/32 - Dispositions pour les communications secrètes ou protégéesProtocoles réseaux de sécurité comprenant des moyens pour vérifier l'identité ou l'autorisation d'un utilisateur du système
• H04L 29/08 - Procédure de commande de la transmission, p.ex. procédure de commande du niveau de la liaison
• G06Q 20/06 - Circuits privés de paiement, p. ex. impliquant de la monnaie électronique utilisée uniquement entre les participants à un programme commun de paiement
• G06Q 20/38 - Protocoles de paiementArchitectures, schémas ou protocoles de paiement leurs détails
• H04L 67/12 - Protocoles spécialement adaptés aux environnements propriétaires ou de mise en réseau pour un usage spécial, p. ex. les réseaux médicaux, les réseaux de capteurs, les réseaux dans les véhicules ou les réseaux de mesure à distance

Abrégé

A data communication system, in which a sender obtains a set of base data elements; generates a first and a second key from (i) the set of base data elements and (ii) sets of first and second entanglement data elements, the first and second keys comprised of a respective first and second public component and a respective first and second private component. A recipient generates first and second ciphers by encoding a digital message using the first and second public components; and sends the first and second ciphers towards the sender apparatus. The sender then extracts the digital message based on the first and second ciphers, the first and second private components, and the sets of first and second entanglement data elements. The private components are not derivable from the public components or from the ciphers irrespective of computing power. A method of digital signing and verification is also described.

Classes IPC  ?

• H04L 29/00 - Dispositions, appareils, circuits ou systèmes non couverts par un seul des groupes
• H04L 9/08 - Répartition de clés

Abrégé

A digital processing method, which comprises obtaining a stream of N-bit input data words; obtaining a value k between 0 and M−1, inclusively, where M>1; processing each of the N-bit input data words at least based on the kth of M permutation elements to produce a corresponding N-bit output data word; and outputting a stream of N-bit output data words on a network or storing the stream of the N-bit output data words in a non-transitory storage medium.

Classes IPC  ?

• H04L 9/06 - Dispositions pour les communications secrètes ou protégéesProtocoles réseaux de sécurité l'appareil de chiffrement utilisant des registres à décalage ou des mémoires pour le codage par blocs, p. ex. système DES
• H04L 9/08 - Répartition de clés

Abrégé

A method that comprises storing a secret S in a non-transitory storage medium, wherein the secret S is shared with the recipient device; obtaining a stream of N-bit input data words; obtaining a value k between 0 and M-1, inclusively, where M>1, wherein the value k is obtained based at least in part on the secret S; processing each of the N-bit input data words at least based on the kth of M pemmtation elements to produce a corresponding N-bit output data word by (a) converting each of the N-bit input data words into a corresponding sparse 2N-element input array, (b) processing the sparse 2N-element input array with said kth of M permutation elements to produce a sparse 2N-element output array and (c) converting the sparse 2N-element output array into the corresponding N-bit output data word; and sending a stream of the N-bit output data words to the recipient device over the network.

Classes IPC  ?

• G06F 7/58 - Générateurs de nombres aléatoires ou pseudo-aléatoires
• G06F 21/62 - Protection de l’accès à des données via une plate-forme, p. ex. par clés ou règles de contrôle de l’accès
• H04L 9/20 - Séquence de clé pseudo-aléatoire combinée élément par élément avec la séquence de données

Abrégé

A digital processing method, which comprises obtaining a stream of N-bit input data words; obtaining a value k between 0 and M-1, inclusively, where M>1; processing each of the N-bit input data words at least based on the kth of M permutation elements to produce a corresponding N-bit output data word; and outputting a stream of N-bit output data words on a network or storing the stream of the N-bit output data words in a non-transitory storage medium.

Classes IPC  ?

• H04L 9/20 - Séquence de clé pseudo-aléatoire combinée élément par élément avec la séquence de données
• G06F 21/62 - Protection de l’accès à des données via une plate-forme, p. ex. par clés ou règles de contrôle de l’accès
• G06F 7/58 - Générateurs de nombres aléatoires ou pseudo-aléatoires

Produits et services

(1) Computer hardware and software for information security namely, firewall, anti-virus protection, intrusion prevention, network vulnerability assessment, network traffic analysis and security management systems; Information security systems, namely computer hardware and software that implement security controls protecting organizations, individuals and devices from security threats (1) Computer hardware installation services in the field of information security and cybersecurity (2) Computer software installation, integration and deployment services in the field of information security and cybersecurity, computer hardware integration and deployment services in the field of information security and cybersecurity; Consulting, research and development services in the field of Internet and information security; Operating a cloud service for securing information in transit and on personal and institutional storage devices

Abrégé

A system comprises a sender node and a trust authority, wherein the trust authority is configured to: generate a token from a shared state associated with the sender node; and store the token in association with an identifier; wherein the sender node is configured to generate said token; generate a signature from message data and the token; generate a message from the message data and the signature; send the signature to the trust authority; and send the message to the recipient node; and wherein the trust authority is further configured to: receive a request from the recipient node, the request specifying the identifier; retrieve the token based on the identifier; and send the token to the recipient node in response to the request. Also, a method of generating a shared token, the shared token being configured such that a second token is recoverable by processing the shared token and a first token generated locally.

Classes IPC  ?

• H04L 9/08 - Répartition de clés
• H03M 7/00 - Conversion d'un code, dans lequel l'information est représentée par une séquence donnée ou par un nombre de chiffres, en un code dans lequel la même information est représentée par une séquence ou par un nombre de chiffres différents
• H04L 9/30 - Clé publique, c.-à-d. l'algorithme de chiffrement étant impossible à inverser par ordinateur et les clés de chiffrement des utilisateurs n'exigeant pas le secret
• H04L 9/32 - Dispositions pour les communications secrètes ou protégéesProtocoles réseaux de sécurité comprenant des moyens pour vérifier l'identité ou l'autorisation d'un utilisateur du système
• G06Q 20/06 - Circuits privés de paiement, p. ex. impliquant de la monnaie électronique utilisée uniquement entre les participants à un programme commun de paiement

Produits et services

(1) Computer hardware and software for information security namely, firewall, anti-virus protection, intrusion prevention, network vulnerability assessment, network traffic analysis and security management systems; Information security systems, namely computer hardware and software that implement security controls protecting organizations, individuals and devices from security threats (1) Computer hardware installation services in the field of information security and cybersecurity (2) Computer software installation, integration and deployment services in the field of information security and cybersecurity, computer hardware integration and deployment services in the field of information security and cybersecurity; Consulting, research and development services in the field of Internet and information security; Operating a cloud service for securing information in transit and on personal and institutional storage devices

Abrégé

A computer-implemented method, which comprises: receiving an input message comprising N-bit input segments, N being an integer greater than one; converting the N-bit input segments into corresponding N-bit output segments using a 2N-by-2N one-to-one mapping stored in a non-transitory storage medium; and generating an output message comprising the N-bit output segments. Also, a computer-implemented method for a recipient to validate a message received from a sender, the message including a first part and a second part. This method comprises receiving a token from a witnessing entity; obtaining a first data element by joint processing of the first part of the message and the token; obtaining a second data element by joint processing of the second part of the message using a key associated with the sender; and validating the message by comparing the first and second data elements.

Classes IPC  ?

• H03M 7/00 - Conversion d'un code, dans lequel l'information est représentée par une séquence donnée ou par un nombre de chiffres, en un code dans lequel la même information est représentée par une séquence ou par un nombre de chiffres différents
• H04L 9/28 - Dispositions pour les communications secrètes ou protégéesProtocoles réseaux de sécurité utilisant un algorithme de chiffrement particulier
• H04L 9/30 - Clé publique, c.-à-d. l'algorithme de chiffrement étant impossible à inverser par ordinateur et les clés de chiffrement des utilisateurs n'exigeant pas le secret
• H04W 12/041 - Génération ou dérivation de clé

Abrégé

N possible output indexes, and setting bits of a corresponding N-bit output segment so as to represent the value of the output index; and causing transmission of a second bit stream formed using each corresponding first output segment to the second apparatus, where a similar operation is performed to recover the N-bit first input segments.

Classes IPC  ?

• H04L 9/00 - Dispositions pour les communications secrètes ou protégéesProtocoles réseaux de sécurité
• H04L 9/06 - Dispositions pour les communications secrètes ou protégéesProtocoles réseaux de sécurité l'appareil de chiffrement utilisant des registres à décalage ou des mémoires pour le codage par blocs, p. ex. système DES
• H04L 9/30 - Clé publique, c.-à-d. l'algorithme de chiffrement étant impossible à inverser par ordinateur et les clés de chiffrement des utilisateurs n'exigeant pas le secret
• H04L 9/14 - Dispositions pour les communications secrètes ou protégéesProtocoles réseaux de sécurité utilisant plusieurs clés ou algorithmes

Abrégé

A computer-implemented method, which comprises: receiving an input message comprising N-bit input segments, N being an integer greater than one; converting the N-bit input segments into corresponding N-bit output segments using a 2N-by-2N one-to-one mapping stored in a non-transitory storage medium; and generating an output message comprising the N-bit output segments. Also, a computer-implemented method for a recipient to validate a message received from a sender, the message including a first part and a second part. This method comprises receiving a token from a witnessing entity; obtaining a first data element by joint processing of the first part of the message and the token; obtaining a second data element by joint processing of the second part of the message using a key associated with the sender; and validating the message by comparing the first and second data elements.

Classes IPC  ?

• H04L 9/00 - Dispositions pour les communications secrètes ou protégéesProtocoles réseaux de sécurité
• G06Q 20/06 - Circuits privés de paiement, p. ex. impliquant de la monnaie électronique utilisée uniquement entre les participants à un programme commun de paiement
• H03M 7/00 - Conversion d'un code, dans lequel l'information est représentée par une séquence donnée ou par un nombre de chiffres, en un code dans lequel la même information est représentée par une séquence ou par un nombre de chiffres différents
• H04L 7/00 - Dispositions pour synchroniser le récepteur avec l'émetteur
• H04L 9/32 - Dispositions pour les communications secrètes ou protégéesProtocoles réseaux de sécurité comprenant des moyens pour vérifier l'identité ou l'autorisation d'un utilisateur du système

Produits et services

(1) Computer hardware and software for information security namely, firewall, anti-virus protection, intrusion prevention, network vulnerability assessment, network traffic analysis and security management systems; Information security systems, namely hardware and software that implement security controls protecting organizations, individuals and devices from security threats. (1) Computer hardware and software installation, integration and deployment services in the field of information security and cybersecurity; Consulting, research and development services in the field of Internet and information security; Operating a cloud service for securing information in transit and on personal and institutional storage devices.

Produits et services

(1) Computer hardware and software for information security namely, firewall, anti-virus protection, intrusion prevention, network vulnerability assessment, network traffic analysis and security management systems; Information security systems, namely hardware and software that implement security controls protecting organizations, individuals and devices from security threats. (1) Computer hardware and software installation, integration and deployment services in the field of information security and cybersecurity; Consulting, research and development services in the field of Internet and information security; Operating a cloud service for securing information in transit and on personal and institutional storage devices.

Produits et services

(1) Computer hardware and software for information security namely, firewall, anti-virus protection, intrusion prevention, network vulnerability assessment, network traffic analysis and security management systems; Information security systems, namely hardware and software that implement security controls protecting organizations, individuals and devices from security threats. (1) Computer hardware and software installation, integration and deployment services in the field of information security and cybersecurity; Consulting, research and development services in the field of Internet and information security; Operating a cloud service for securing information in transit and on personal and institutional storage devices.

Produits et services

(1) Computer hardware and software for information security namely, firewall, anti-virus protection, intrusion prevention, network vulnerability assessment, network traffic analysis and security management systems; Information security systems, namely hardware and software that implement security controls protecting organizations, individuals and devices from security threats. (1) Computer hardware and software installation, integration and deployment services in the field of information security and cybersecurity; Consulting, research and development services in the field of Internet and information security; Operating a cloud service for securing information in transit and on personal and institutional storage devices.